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AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE "BUSINESS"
TEST FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NET OPERATING
LOSS CARRYOVER
RICHARD S. ROTHIBERGt
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
for a net operating loss carryback against prior income and carryover
against future income. One of the most persistent problems in the
administration of this section and its predecessors1 has been caused by
the effort to determine the circumstances under which losses remain
available for use against future gains despite a change either in the
nature of the loss-producing enterprise or in its ownership.
Perhaps because of an unfortunate use of the term "the taxpayer"
in the predecessors of section 172,2 the first cases to consider this
problem focused their attention upon the corporate entity. Thus in
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering the Supreme Court considered
the availability of losses to a corporation which had undergone what
would now be a reorganization under section 368 (a) (1) (F). Although
the court acknowledged that the nature of the enterprise and its
ownership remained the same, it denied the carryover because the
transaction had extinguished the old corporate entity. Later, on the
theory that a merger, as opposed to a contractual reorganization,
"drowns" the transferor in its successor, the Court held in Helvering
v. Metropolitan Edison Co.' that a parent into which a wholly-owned
subsidiary had been merged might succeed to the subsidiary's un-
amortized bond discount.
Two important developments have made substantial inroads into
this basic "entity" approach. The details of these developments will
be discussed as they become relevant. The first is the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 which in section 381 specified certain trans-
actions wherein the loss carryover would pass from one corporate
entity to another. Congress also set out in section 382(b) some
t Member, Indiana Bar.
1. Particularly INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 122, 53 Stat. 867, as amended, 64
Stat. 937 (1950), 65 Stat. 452, 505 (1951).
2. ERg., INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 122 (b) (2) (C), 65 Stat. 505 (1951)
read in part: "If for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1947, and before
January 1, 1950, the taxpayer has a net operating loss ... " (emphasis added).
3. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
4. 306 U.S. 522 (1939).
AN ARGUMENT FOR
important limitations upon the loss carryover in cases where the
requisite continuity of ownership was not present. In addition, section
382(a) disallows the carryover in certain situations where there has
been both a substantial change in ownership and a change in the nature
of the enterprise, even though the corporate "entity" has remained
unchanged. This provision supplements section 129 of the 1939
Code' which was reenacted as section 269 of the 1954 Code-a
provision which disallows the carryover if the corporation is acquired
for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.
The second important development is Libson Shops, Inc. v.
Koehler6 decided after the enactment of the 1954 Code but applying
the 1939 Code in which the Court purported to reject the "entity"
approach of New Colonial Ice and Metropolitan Edison and applied
instead a "continuity of business enterprise" test to the operation of
the carryover provision.
As a result of these developments, the nature of the enterprise
which produced the losses and the nature of the enterprise which
produced the gains against which these losses would be offset have
become important factors governing the availability of the carryover.
This article concludes that the possible justifications for this emphasis
upon the nature of the businesses involved do not outweigh the
substantial problems of definition and consistency with other parts of
the Code which have resulted from this "business" test. Therefore,
the availability of the carryover should be made to depend entirely
upon whether or not the people who owned the loss-producing enter-
prise also own at least a part of the profitable enterprise which is
seeking to use those losses. Two things about this proposal should be
noted here. First, the proposal cuts two different ways-a carryover
otherwise available would not be lost because the profitable enterprise
differs in nature from the losing enterprise and a carryover otherwise
lost would not be saved because the enterprise remains the same.
Second, the proposal does not solve the very difficult questions about
the definition of "ownership." However, it is believed that these
questions are all present in existing law; so if this proposal solves no
problems at least it does not create any new ones.
IL CHOICES AND ECONOMIC POLICY-A FRAME OF REFERENCE
The tax system could adopt a rule that the carryover will be
disallowed if either ownership or "business nature" has changed. It
might adopt one test to the exclusion of the other; it might allow the
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 129, 58 Stat. 47 (1944).
6. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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carryover unless both have changed; or, as is now the case, it might
adopt a number of rules, dependent upon the extent of the changes in
ownership and business and upon some third variable such as the
form of the transaction. Abstract analysis of these choices in their
simplest form could never produce a satisfactory answer to a difficult
case but it gives a framework for analyzing the policies which might
underlie section 172 and for relating these policies to the cases.
The purposes of the loss carryover are undoubtedly best served
in a business which has undergone neither a change in the nature of
its operations nor a change in ownership. The important question
must be whether the aims of the statute would be better served by
viewing the carryover as a benefit to the owners of the loss corporation
or by viewing it as a part of the loss-producing enterprise itself. A
search for the purposes of section 172 has been inconclusive. The best
guide to the purposes of the loss carryover is a comment upon its
proposed elimination, contained in a House report accompanying
passage of the 1939 Code:
... A business with alternating profit and loss is required to
pay higher taxes over a period of years than a business with
stable profits, although the average income of the two firms
is equal. New enterprises and the capital-goods industries are
especially subject to wide fluctuations in earnings. It is, there-
fore, believed that the allowance of a net operating loss
carry-over will greatly aid business and stimulate new enter-
prises.
This statement suggests three separate purposes, one based upon
fairness and two upon economic considerations.8
One reason for the statute is that it is unfair to tax the unstable
or cyclical business upon its gains without allowing for the losses of
its bad periods. Otherwise a business subject to cycles more than a
year in length will pay a higher tax over that cycle than a business
with the same profits earned evenly from year to year. One view
of this argument is that the losses of an unstable business are the
cost of sustaining that business until the economy again has sufficient
need of it to reward it with profits; this view suggests that the carry-
over should not be denied on account of a change in ownership but
that a change in the nature of the business would remove the justi-
7. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1939).
8. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND JOINT CoMMInTTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION, BUSINESS Loss OFFSETS 2-11 (1947), in B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOmE,
ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 831-35 (3d ed. 1964).
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fication for the carryover. Similarly, if the fluctuations are due to an
inherent inability of that kind of business to match expenses with the
revenue, then a business test for denial of the carryover would be
appropriate. But one can view this argument as meaning that the
owners of risky and cyclical enterprises should be treated the same
as those who prefer steadier incomes. This latter view suggests that
an "ownership" test of denial should be used.
A second purpose of the carryover is to remove one impediment
to the undertaking of new enterprises-the tendency for even a success-
ful business to lose money in its formative years. To fulfill this
purpose, the carryover is addressed to those who would undertake a
new enterprise. But this does not mean an ownership test would best
carry out this purpose. The real beneficiaries under this view of the
purpose of the carryover are not the owners of the business but the
segments of the economy which want it or need it enough to reward it
with profits. To best carry out this purpose the carryover should stay
with the business until the business prospers or is abandoned and
should not go with the original investors who were not patient enough
to see it through.
A third purpose of the carryover is to maximize the stabilizing
effect of the taxing system upon the economy. To some extent expendi-
tures, especially expenditures for plant and equipment, can be timed
independently of the receipt of revenues, which fluctuate greatly from
year to year in many businesses. In the absence of a carryover,
businessmen would try to match these expenditures against receipts in
order to minimize their tax. This matching process would then accentu-
ate the business cycle. The carryover, however, serves a function
similar to depreciation in minimizing this effect. Thus the stabilizing
purpose would suggest that the carryover should remain with the
business through a change in ownership. But there is another possible
view. Earnings are an important source of new investment and, to the
extent that the carryover evens out the flow of earnings, it will even
out the flow of new investment as well. If our concern is a smooth
flow of profits to investors we should focus upon them and not upon
their businesses. According to this view the carryover should be left
with the owner as he shifts to a new enterprise.
Little more can be safely said about the Congressional purpose
in creating a net operating loss carryover than that Congress was not
specifically concerned with the problems of corporate acquisitions
and reorganizations when it originated the carryover. The carryover
principle long antedates the first Congressional attempt (in the 1954
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Code) to relate it specifically to such transactions.9 Because there is
little evidence that Congress intended the adoption of a business test
in administering the carryover provision, it should be asked what contri-
bution such a test makes to the legislative purpose and whether or not
that contribution is worth the trouble such a test creates.
III. THE "BUSINESS" TEST
A. Justifications
1. Prevention of "trafficking in loss carryovers"
Undoubtedly the most important reason for having limitations
upon the availability of loss carryovers is the desire to prevent the
use of a defunct company's loss as a tax avoidance device by some
unrelated business."0 Certainly, in many such cases, the loss will be
used to offset gains from a different kind of business and a "business"
test might be an effective means of identifying such abuses. But, as
will be discussed, the business test is subject to substantial difficulties.
In view of these difficulties it is appropriate to ask whether or not
such a test is really the most effective approach to the "trafficking"
problem. It is not for many reasons.
First, the cases which are easily identifiable as abuses could be
reached by an ownership test. The typical case of abuse is that of a
corporation with substantial losses which finally quits, sells its assets,
and becomes a "shell." The shareholders then peddle the one remaining
asset, the carryover, wherever they can." Such cases invariably involve
a change of ownership so an ownership test would be effective against
them. Section 269 of the 1954 Code and its predecessor, section 129
of the 1939 Code, have been successful weapons against the most
obvious abuses; these sections are operative only if there has been a
change in "control" and the nature of the businesses involved is
relevant only insofar as it helps determine whether or not tax avoidance
was the principal purpose of the transfer. 2 In other such cases the
9. Section 129 of the 1939 CODE, the predecessor of section 269 of the 1954
CODE, has been applied to this area, but section 269 is of more general application.
10. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., in 3 U.S., CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621, 4684 (1954).
11. E.g., J.G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1962); Brown
Dynalube Co. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Commissioner v. British
Motor Car Distrib., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson,
264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959) ; American Pipe & Steel
Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
12. At one time this tax avoidance section was not fully effective because it was
thought not to apply to the corporation itself when a corporation changed hands.
Alprose Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948). But this rule has been completely repudiated,
Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816
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carryover has been denied under the Libson Shops doctrine 3 despite
a finding that the principal purpose was not tax avoidance. While it
is true that both section 269 and the Libson doctrine have depended to
some extent upon a change in business-indeed Libson has often
depended solely on a change in business,' 4 the point here is only that
an ownership test is sufficient to prevent the most obvious abuses.'5
A second important reason that a business test is not the most
effective approach is that, in cases where ownership of the loss business
and gain business is truly the same, use of the carryover is now
thought to be proper no matter how different the two businesses are.
In other words, in cases where a business test would most obviously be
needed, it is not applied. This, however, has not always been the case.
In the Libson Shops case, the businesses incurring the losses and
earning the profits were owned by the same people in the same
proportions. But this aspect of the Libson doctrine is no longer
followed. The most obvious situation for a denial of a carryover
where ownership has not changed would be a situation in which the
owners of a loss corporation sold all its assets; purchased, with
substantial new capital of their own, the assets of a profitable going
business of an entirely different kind; and plugged those assets into
the old corporate shell. Section 382(a) would not apply because no
stock in the loss corporation had changed hands nor would section 381
or the limitations of section 382 (b) be applicable because the loss corpora-
tion's entity survives. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled" that
it will not seek to apply the Lisbon doctrine to such a case. Section 269
(a) (1) is not applicable because no one has acquired control of a
corporation and section 269(a) (2) is not applicable because the
transfer of assets was not in a tax-free form. If instead the corporation
(1959); Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distrib., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960),
thereby removing one obstacle to effective use of the ownership test as a weapon
against abuse.
13. Norden-Ketay Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 953 (1963) ; Frederick Steel Co., 42 T.C. 13 (1964).
14. The use of section 269 and the Libson doctrine in conjunction with the
"business test" will be analyzed infra.
15. The Sixth Circuit has very recently cast some doubt on this conclusion. In
Frederick Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 36
U.S.L.W. 3158 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1967), the court reversed the Tax Court and in the
precess revealed a very substantial loophole in the ownership test established by section
332(a) (1) of the 1954 CODE. Of course this demonstrates only that the present
ownership test may not be entirely adequate. It does not demonstrate that trafficking
cannot be curbed without a business test. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit did not disturb
a Tax Court finding that the acquisition was not for the purpose of taking advantage
of the loss. It may therefore be questioned whether this is really a "trafficking" case
to begin with.
16. Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 Cur. BULL. 46.
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purchased the stock of the profitable corporation and liquidated it,
section 269 might be applicable, but the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled17 that, in such a case, it will not contend that the principal
purpose is tax avoidance. The conclusion is inescapable that neither
the Congress nor the Internal Revenue Service intends that the carry-
over be denied in such a case; this is a clear indication that the loss
carryover is to be administered primarily as a benefit to the owners
of the loss-producing enterprise and not as an attribute of the losing
enterprise itself. If use of the carryover is to be permitted in this
hypothetical case, then use of the proceeds from the asset sale, without
the injection of new capital, to purchase a business and use of the
proceeds to start a new business would seem a fortiori to be situations
in which the carryover should be allowed."
A third argument against the contention that the business test is
needed to combat "loss .trafficking" is that the Congress does not seem
to think it is necessary. The business test appears in the Code in two
places: section 269 (as an indication of motive) and section 382 (a).
But both these sections contain the prerequisite that ownership
change,' 9 which indicates that the purpose of the business test is not
to locate abuses where the business has changed, but rather to remove
from the operation of these sections cases where the business is the
same. Whether, as Congress seems to think, the carryover should be
allowed in an unchanged business with new owners is an entirely
different question, which will be discussed below. Plainly the business
test cannot be totally eliminated unless it is decided that the carryover
should be denied to an unchanged business with new owners. But
whatever view is taken of this latter question, the Congress clearly
does not intend that a change in business alone should be used as a
ground for attacking the carryover.
The legislative history of the 1954 Code supports this view. The
initial House version of section 382 contained no references to the
type of business. Commenting upon its proposal, the House Report
said:
This special limitation on net operating loss carryovers
provides an objective standard governing the availability of a
major tax benefit which has been abused through trafficking
in corporations with operating loss carryovers, the tax bene-
17. Id.
18. Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), was of the latter type. The carry-
over in that case was allowed on the ground that the entity had not changed.
19. Section 269 uses the term "control" but defines it to mean ownership of stock.
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fits of which are exploited by persons other than those who
incurred the loss.2" (emphasis added.)
The Senate added the change of business test now found in section
382(a)(1) (C) and the Senate Report indicates that by so doing it
intended to enlarge the availability of the carryover, not to reduce
it further.2'
Finally, the Regulations promulgated under section 382 (a) (1) (C)
indicate that one of the targets of section 382, at least in the view of
the Internal Revenue Service, is a transfer of a corporation within
the same industry; this view of section 382 would strongly support
the inference that "trafficking" is an entirely personal concept that
has nothing to do with the kinds of business involved. One Regulation
in particular supports this view.22 It denies the carryover to a business
which is inactive at the time of the stock transfer and is subsequently
reactivated in the same line of work. An example, found in the
Regulations, is that of a machinery manufacturing firm which suspends
its activities, is sold, and then resumes identical operations under its
new ownership.23 It would seem that the Internal Revenue Service is
seeking to confine this permissive aspect of the busienss test within
extremely narrow limits. It is therefore necessary to ask what purpose,
if any, is served by this permissive use of the business test.
2. Permitting use of the carryover although, ozrnership has
changed
The above discussion left open the question of whether or not
a business test should be used to permit some use of carryovers where
the losing enterprise later makes profits but under different ownership.
As has been discussed, there is economic justification for this view-
point. But in view of Congress' basic commitment to an ownership
approach, allowing carryovers in the additional case of an unchanged
business under new ownership creates more trouble than it is worth.
Fully realizing its undesirability from the taxpayer's point of view,
the author concludes that Congress should reconsider this particular
act of legislative grace.
First, it may be argued that the carryover offers an incentive to
new management to rejuvenate a losing business. Perhaps the best
example of the appeal of this agrument is Wallace Corp.,24 in which
20. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4017, 4067 (1954).
21. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4621, 4684 (1954).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (6) (1962).
23. Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958 Cum. BULL. 190 gives a similar example.
24. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Men. 39 (1964).
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the taxpayer was a manufacturer and wholesaler of toothpicks, clothes-
pins, and food trays. Forster, who had a similar business, purchased
all the stock of WVallace in the belief, which proved correct, that he
could substantially improve its operations and make it a profitable
enterprise. The Tax Court found that under section 382(a)(1)(C)
the business had not changed and allowed a carryover. This sort of
regeneration of a business is certainly desirable economically and if
may be that the purchaser derived an incentive to act from the carry-
over which awaited him if he succeeded. But it is certainly open to
question whether or not this is what Congress meant by the "stimula-
tion of new enterprises." This was not the granting of a carryover
to a new business to help it overcome the expected losses of its early
years. The losses in the present case were an established fact and there
is no reason in fairness or in economics to make them available to the
purchaser. Such losses are not available to a businessman starting a
new business. The potential for profits should be incentive enough.
The Wallace case also suggests a second difficulty with the rule
that the carryover remains available to an unchanged business under
new ownership: the rule is potentially inconsistent with the well-
established principle that the carryover is available to a new business
under the same ownership as the losing business.2" For example, if
Forster had purchased the Wallace Corporation assets for cash, the
carryover would have remained with the old owners. The possibility
of two carryovers is avoided only because the carryover is treated
initially as an attribute of the corporate entity; Forster got the carry-
over because he bought the stock instead of the assets. If both these
principles are allowed to exist simultaneously, then location of the
carryover will often be only a matter of form. In such a case the
parties could put the carryover where they like and this possibility
encourages rather than discourages "trafficking." Of course this argu-
ment tells us only that one or the other of these principles must go;
it does not tell us which.
Another difficulty with the business approach to preservation of
the carryover is that it makes the carryover available for "bootstrap"
acquisitions. For example, in Glover Packing Co. v. United States,"
the loss corporation was in the meat packing business. Glover, an
experienced packer, purchased ten per cent of the stock and discharged
ten per cent of the indebtedness. He was given the right to manage the
25. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1939), quoted at text accom-
panying note 7 .spra.
26. See discussion following note 15 supra.
27. 328 F.2d 342 (Ct. C1. 1964).
AN ARGUMENT FOR
corporation and to nominate the directors. The rest of the stock was
placed in escrow to be returned to the corporate treasury gradually as
the corporation discharged its remaining indebtedness. The purpose
of the arrangement was plainly to use the earnings, sheltered from tax
by the carryover, as a means of transferring the business to Glover.
The court rightly found that ownership had changed within the meaning
of section 382(a) because the escrowed stock had no fair market
value. The business was found to have changed, within the meaning
of section 382(a) (1) (C) because it had been inactive prior to the
transfer. Although the effort failed in this case, this "bootstrap"
technique would not be any less available for purchase of an active
but losing corporation. In Superior Garment Co. 8 a similar technique
did work. The latter transaction was even more obviously a bootstrap
because the note given as part consideration for Superior's stock was
conditioned upon and limited in amount by the tax savings due to
the carryover. Of course, to label a transaction as a bootstrap sale is
not necessarily to condemn it. There were substantial business reasons
for both these transactions. The use of earnings to finance the acquisi-
tion of an enterprise so that the enterprise can get back on its feet may
be desirable economically. But the application of the "business test"
has the result that the otherwise taxable earnings resulting from the
energies of new management are diverted from the Government to the
old owners of the business, who have in effect given up on the enter-
prise. It would be surprising if Congress actually intended to be so
generous.
Thus far it has been assumed that the question whether or not the
business test is satisfied has already been answered. Because applica-
tion of this test is an extremely complicated process, a great advantage
of doing away with it is that all these complex problems would be
avoided.
B. Problems
1. Definition
a. Section 382 (a) (1) (C) and its Regulations.
This section denies the carryover to a corporation which, in a
taxable purchase transaction, undergoes a described change in owner-
ship, but only if "such corporation has not continued to carry on a trade
or business substantially the same as that conducted before any change
in the percentage ownership of the fair market value of such stock, ...29
23. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1571 (1965).
29. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 382 (a) (1) (C).
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The statute seems to require only that "a business" previously
conducted by the loss corporation continue, not that the subsequent
gains come from the same business which produced the losses. The
Regulations" make some effort to deal with this ambiguity by their
observation that the general objective of section 382(a) is to disallow
the carryover where used "to offset gains of a business unrelated to
that which produced the losses."'" But "unrelated" is an unsatis-
factory word here. A business may be substantially different from the
loss business and yet be "related." One question would be whether or
not a business is sufficiently "related" if it was owned by those who
owned the loss business and sold along with it. The Regulations32 give
two examples which suggest that the carryover will not be available
if the losing portion of such a conglomerate enterprise is discontinued.
This might suggest that the surviving business is not sufficiently
"related."
But if these Regulations are intended to express a policy that the
losses should be available only against gains from the same "business,"
it is difficult to explain another Regulation" which says that if the
old business is continued and a new one is added, the carryover is
available against the earnings of the added division."' It is not readily
apparent why the tax shelter of past losses should be held out as a
reward for keeping a losing enterprise going. At any rate, the reasoning
behind this Regulation has yielded at least one taxpayer victory.3"
A principle that has produced substantial difficulty under this
section is that the same business has not been "continued" if it is
inactive at the time of the change in ownership. The purpose of this
Regulation is to prevent "trafficking" within the same industry.3
The simplest application would be a highly personalized service
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1(h) (5) (1962).
31. This language is apparently borrowed from S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 21,
at 4684.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-i (h) (7) (1962).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (8) (1962).
34. Subject to the test of motive in section 269.
35. Goodwyn Crockery Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 355 (1961), affd, 315 F.2d
110 (6th Cir. 1963). In Euclid-Tennessee, Inc., 41 T.C. 752 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 991
(6th Cir. 1965) the Tax Court distinguished Goodwyn. partly on the ground that in the
Euclid case the added business was owned by the purchasers of the losing business.
Note that this distinction is based on ownership; it must be an effort to prevent the
purchase of loss corporations to reduce the taxes of a going business, a policy hardly
related to the nature of the businesses and better dealt with by an ownership test.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h) (6) (1962).
37. H.F. Ramsey Co., 43 T.C. 500, 515 & n.6 (1965); Clarksdale Rubber Co., 45
T.C. 234, 245 (1965). See text preceeding note 24 supra.
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industry." Another Regulation,39 however, is probably better suited
to such a case; it recognizes that a servicing business is substantially
the same as its owner, with whom the service is identified. The carry-
over should be denied where such a business declines and the shell
is sold to another individual rendering the same services. It would
seem, however, that an ownership test is a far more direct approach
to such a case.
Where the nature of the business is not personal to its owner, but
the business is resumed in order to perform precisely the same
function it was performing before, application of the "not continued
if inactive" principle" is more difficult, as Barclay Jewelry Co.4
shows. The Tax Court allowed the carryover on the ground that the
corporation did not become inactive until after the transfer.4 2 The
First Circuit reversed,43 saying that the intent to carry on the business,
as manifested by actually doing so after acquiring it, is the relevant
factor in interpreting this section. This suggests that the purpose of
section 382(a) (1) (C) is to allow the carryover to a purchaser in order
to induce the purchaser to compensate the seller for the loss. In that
way the seller can recoup. The court said that this was the only reason
it could see that Congress would want to allow the carryover to a
purchaser.
Not only is this supposed purpose, which is nowhere expressed
in the legislative history, contrary to the expressed purpose of eliminat-
ing "trafficking," but, if the court's version of the purpose is correct,
section 382 (a) (1) (C) actually hinders it.
In order to show that section 382(a) (1) (C) facilitates this
purpose the court said:
It seems manifest that a purchaser who abandons the business,
and has no plans to continue it, is not the sort of purchaser who
could be expected to make any payment to the seller on ac-
count of an available tax loss.... ."
This is absurd. The purchaser who buys a business to get the loss
carryover is the purchaser least likely to carry on the old business. If
Congress wanted to compensate the owner of a losing business by
inducing a purchaser to compensate him for the loss, then Congress
38. A good example would be the insurance agency in Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958-1
Cum. BULL. 190.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1(h) (10) (1962).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a) -1 (h) (6) (1962).
41. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1443 (1965).
42. The opposite result in Fawn Fashions, Inc., 41 T.C. 205 (1963), may be
justified on this same ground.
43. 367 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 196.
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only hindered that purpose by requiring the purchaser to continue
the business.
The Tax Court's criterion, based upon the timing of the inactivity,
is a sound approach to some cases. In many cases the inactivity will be
due to losses and an effort to find a buyer, in which case the timing of
the inactive period would be an accurate indication of "trafficking."
But the inactivity may be due to other factors, as the First Circuit in
Barclay Jewelry recognized." For example, in United States v.
Fenix & Scisson, Inc.4" the loss corporation was a marginal producer
of lead and zinc. Because of the expense of reactivating a mine which
has been closed down, these marginal producers are often kept in a state
of readiness, during periods of low prices, to await a price increase
sufficient to make operations profitable. Although in this particular
case the court refused to believe that "readiness" was the reason for
the inactivity, the case demonstrates that this inactivity standard is
at best a crude approach to the "trafficking" problem.
In recent cases the Tax Court has shown great versatility in dealing
with inactivity. For example, in H.F. Ramsey Co.17 the court con-
sidered a construction business which was completing outstanding
contracts and winding up its affairs; i.e., it was not a mere shell at
the time of negotiations for sale; this business was found not to be
inactive.4" And in Clarksdale Rubber Co.49 the court allowed the
carryover to a corporation which suspended its manufacturing, leased
its plant, and remained active only in the sense that it continued to
deal with its financial problems.
Another source of confusion under section 382 (a) (1) (C) is the
test expressed in the Regulations" that the same business has not been
"continued" if the location of a major portion of the activities is
changed and, as a result, the business is "substantially altered." In
Goodwyn Crockery Co. v. Commissioner,1 a change in the center of
operations was found not to be determinative because the business was
still serving the same geographic market. The second and third exam-
ples under this Regulation, like Goodwyz, consider merchandising bus-
inesses and also rely on the market served by the firms as a test of the
importance in the change of location. But the first example concerns a
45. Id. at 195 & n.3.
46. 360 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036, rehearing denied,
388 U.S. 924 (1967).
47. 43 T.C. 500 (1965).
48. The carryover in that case was disallowed under section 269.
49. 45 T.C. 234 (1965).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (9) (1962).
51. 37 T.C. 355 (1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963).
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manufacturer who continues to make the same product for the same
customers but with a different plant, equipment, and employees. This
example is puzzling. So long as the business is serving the same
market in the same way there is no apparent reason for denying, the
carryover on the ground that the "business" has changed. The justi-
fications for the carryover-fair treatment of fluctuations in profits,
minimization of risk, dampening the business cycle-do not suggest
any basis for distinguishing between manufacturers and merchandisers
or between businesses which own their facilities and businesses which
lease their facilities. If the market for the business is nationwide, as
will more often be the case with manufacturers than with merchan-
disers, a market test of location would not affect such a business. But
this suggests that a change in location does not substantially alter that
business; it does not suggest that a test other than the location of the
market served should be applied to manufacturers.
This brief survey of the difficulties so far encountered in the
administration of section 382(a)(1)(C) shows that it has caused
section 382 to fall considerably short of the legislative purpose of
adding certainty to the carryover provisions."
b. The Libson Shops Doctrine
The business approach to the availability of the loss carryover
is not confined to the 1954 Code. The doctrine of Libson Shops v.
Koelder' 3 has been applied to deny the carryover on the ground that
a change in business, as well as a change in ownership, might destroy
the requisite "continuity of business enterprise." It is clear that the
Libson case depends upon a difference in business because all the
corporations involved in the case were owned by the same people in
the same proportions throughout the period in question.
One of the problems raised by the Libson line of cases is what
importance, if any, these cases have under the 1954 Code; although
decided in 1957, Libson applied the 1939 Code. If a case arose in
which the business test of Libson would not be met, but section 382
would allow the carryover, it would be necessary to decide whether
Libson applies to the 1954 Code. But since the differences between
Libson and section 382 are most striking in the ownership area, this
problem will be considered later. If the business test of Libson and
section 382 are the same, then the courts will no doubt rely on Libson
era cases as authority even if Libson is not expressly applicable to
cases arising under the 1954 Code.
52. S. REP. No. 1622, supra, note 21, at 4684.
53. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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Since the Libson case and section 382 serve the same basic
purpose-limiting the carryover to those applications which Con-
gress intended, it would seem unnecessarily complicated to have two
business tests. One is bad enough. The Internal Revenue Service
takes this view; it has announced that it will not rely upon Libson
under the 1954 Code if there has not been a change in business as
defined in section 382 and its Reuglations. 4 One Tax Court opinion
suggests that the two tests depend upon similar considerations" but
does not consider any possible differences. In Clarksdale Rubber
Co." the Tax Court suggests that section 382(a) (1) (C) is more
restrictive but it then says that this section is the exclusive test in cases
where 382 (a) (1) (A)'s ownership test applies. This conclusion, how-
ever, would have no meaning unless the court thought there were at
least some circumstances in which Libson is more restrictive. In
Euclid-Tennessee, Inc. v. Commissioner" the court suggests that the
1939 Code, as construed by Libson, was more restrictive than the 1954
Code. But no decision has yet been based upon a difference between
these tests nor has one suggested a particular in which they might
differ. Also, since Libson followed the 1954 Code it could not be
argued that Congress intended section 382 to be applied without
regard to Libson. It thus appears that the cases decided under Libson's
business test do have value in interpreting section 382 (a) (1) (C) even
if Libson is not itself applicable.
In the Libson case, sixteen women's apparel stores and a seven-
teenth management unit were all separately incorporated; the cor-
porations were owned by the same people in the same proportions.
Three of the stores had losses. The corporations were all then merged
and the combined enterprise sought to carry these losses against post-
merger income of the group. The three losing stores continued to lose
The Supreme Court denied the carryover. Since each store was an
easily identifiable economic unit and separate accounting was main-
tained after the merger, the Court concluded that the losing enterprises
were not the same businesses as the profitable enterprises."s
It is not always so easy to distinguish the losing enterprise from
the profitable enterprise that succeeds it because defining the essence
of a business can be very difficult. For example, in Federal Cemenw
54. T.I,R. No. 773, 1965 P-H FED. TAX SERV. 55,063.
55. Wallace Corp., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 39 (1964).
56. 45 T.C. 234 (1965).
57. 352 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1965).
58. The difficulties raised for cases of this type by consolidated reporting will
be discussed below.
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Title Co.f the loss corporation manufactured cement roofing slabs
in the East. Its successor corporation also made cement roofing slabs
but did so in the Midwest and without using a patented process which
the loss company had used. The Tax Court, relying on the change in
process, denied the carryover. The appellate court emphasized the
change in location. A change in location which results in serving
a new market should be a sufficient change in business to invoke
Libson. because the only difference among the stores in Libson was
that they served different markets. But a change in process of manu-
facture could be of such varying importance from one business to
another that its use and the use of similar changes short of a change in
the product itself invite unnecessarily complicated distinctions.
It is tempting to define a business in the Libson sense as a bundle
of assets which must work together to earn particular income.60 This
approach works quite well with a chain of stores in separate cities.
But it is not at all appropriate for corporations which are closely
identified with their owners and acquire new assets with each particular
undertaking. Such corporations are especially common in the con-
struction inudstry."1 Nor is it an appropriate approach to a corporation
which is organized to perform a particular essential function for
some other corporation. 2 Furthermore it does not offer any guide
for the addition of a complementary new line to a going business.63
Finally it does not tell whether or not the elimination of substantial
liabilities and the injection of new working capital changes the nature
of the business."
One difficulty with Libson's business test is that many of the
cases which apply it involve a change in ownership as well and the
courts cumulate the changes so that it is not clear whether or not the
59. 40 T.C. 1028 (1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1964).
60. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 475 takes this approach. This ruling
permits use of the carryover only where the income is attributable to assets which
were acquired from the loss corporation and used in continuing the prefusion business.
This ruling is inapplicable by its own terms to transactions governed by section
381(a) of the 1954 CODE.
61. See, e.g., Urban Redevelopment Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 328 (4th
Cir. 1961). The purchaser of the corporation wanted certain plans which the corporation
did not have. If it had, it is questionable which would be the primary asset-the initiative
of the owner or the right to develop the plans. Only one had changed.
62. See, e.g., Bookwvalter v. Hutchens Metal Prod., 281 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1960),
in which the taxpayer was organized as a sales outlet for a manufacturer and the
court distinguished the sales function from the manufacturing function.
63. Such as the unsuccessful attempt to add an aluminum window and partition
line to an existing steel partition business in Virginia Metal Prod., 33 T.C. 788 (1960),
rev'd, 290 F.2d 675 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961).
64. In Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 828 (1961), the court thought this change, together with a change in owner-
ship, was enough.
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change in business was alone sufficient. Moreover, businesses are of so
many different kinds and can change in so many different ways that
the effort to describe those changes which are sufficient to produce a
"different" business seems doomed to frustration. Since it is far from
clear that such a test is needed to fulfill the basic purposes of the
loss carryover, this effort to define the "business" test hardly seems
worth the trouble.
2. Consistency with Other Parts of the Code
A second major difficulty with the "business" approach to the
denial of loss carryovers is that the Code does not generally regard the
economic source of gains and losses as significant. The basic approach
of the corporate income tax is to tax the corporate entity upon the gaihs
from whatever activities happen to fall under the corporate umbrella."'
It is not feasible to separate one particular tax attribute such as a net
operating loss carryover and administer it on the basis of the character
of its source while earnings generally are not separated in that fashion.
The Libson Shops case provides an excellent illustration of this
difficulty. The Court treated each of the stores in the Libson group
as a separate economic unit serving a separate market and refused to
allow the use of losses from one unit to offset gains from another.
The Court recognized the possibility that consolidating the returns of
these units would accomplish the same thing but overcame this dif-
ficulty by arguing that the parties had elected not to do so. 6
Another case which ably illustrates this difficulty with the Libson
business test is Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc."7 Bowser, Inc. manufactured
liquid pumps and meters and owned a number of subsidiaries which
manufactured various items. One of the subsidiaries, which made
nuts and bolts, incurred losses in 1948 and 1949. Its assets were then
sold to interests unconnected with Bowser. Bowser attempted to include
these losses in its consolidated returns for 1950 and 1951 and the court al-
lowed the carryover. It pointed out that, since the real sufferer of the loss
was Bowser, the Congressional purpose would be served by allowing
65. This principle is not limited to the corporate income tax. In Zanesville
Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507, 510 (6th Cir. 1964) the court says:
Individuals, partnerships and corporations have long been permitted to off-
set the losses incurred in one business of the taxpayer against profits realized
by another business of the same taxpayer. Thus, there is no "legislative plan"
that prohibits such offsetting.
The court cites Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 46 in support of this proposition.
66. 353 U.S. 382, 388 (1957). An interesting irony of this case is that the Court
was wrong in concluding that consolidation was available. F.C. Donovan, Inc. v. United
States, 261 F.2d 470, 475 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Sinrich, Libsom Shops-Air A'rgi nnent Against
its Applicatmo Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAx L. REv. 167 (1958).
67. 32 T.C. 1222 (1959).
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the carryover against Bowser's later income. The difference between
the screw company which produced the losses and the pump and
meter company which produced the gains is at least as great as the
difference between the losing stores and the profitable stores in
Libson. But any other result in Weidenhoff would be hard to support.
If consolidation of losses and gains is allowed while the loss business
continues and the consolidated enterprise thereby generates a carry-
over, there is no conceivable reason for wiping away the carryover
simply because the bad apple is eliminated. Libson's business test thus
depends entirely upon the added circumstance that consolidation is
not available and the availability of consolidation is a matter of owner-
ship and form, not of the nature of the business conducted.68
A consolidated group can end all argument about the use of
losses from one member to offset gains of another by merging. No one
contends that the separate divisions of a single corporation must be
accounted for separately. As will be discussed below, sections 381 and
"382(b) of the 1954 Code, which govern the availability of a carry-
over to merged enterprises, make no use of a business test. Such cases
as Irving-Kohnar Corp.,69 Frank Ix & Sons Va. Corp.,"0 and the
Libson case itself, which involve the tax-free combination of different
enterprises owned by the same people in the same proportions, are
troublesome because of the possibility of consolidated reporting. It is
significant that the results in all three cases would in all likelihood
have been different had they been decided under 1954 Code.7'
To be sure, the rules governing consolidated returns contain
limiations somewhat like the "business enterprise" limitation in the
Libson case. The consolidation privilege is subject to regulations
which, until very recently, provided that the losses of a corporation
which filed a separate return were available only against the income
68. Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964),
concludes after examining the legislative history of the consolidation provisions that
Congress intended to treat enterprises owned by the same group as one "business."
This case, like the Treasury regulations discussed below, distinguishes a pre-affiliation
known loss from losses generated after affiliation.
69. 35 T.C. 712 (1961).
70. 45 T.C. 533 (1966).
71. In Libson and Irving-Kolnar the loss corporations were merged out of
existence thus making section 381 expressly applicable. In LV the loss corporation
survived but the limitation on the availability of carryovers in section 382(a) of the
1954 CoDE would definitely not 'be applicable. In all three cases the carryover would be
denied under the 1954 CoDE only by reason of the "business" branch of the Libson
doctrine; as is pointed out beginning at text following note 15 supra and preceeding
note 71 infra, this branch at least of the Libson doctrine is practically dead.
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of that same corporation after consolidation."' This rule has now
been liberalized to some extent?., By virtue of the definition of
"separate return limitation year,"74 the carryover is available to the
group if the subsidiary was a member of the group on each day of
the loss year.7" The requirements for "membership" are in section
1504 and are based upon ownership. In effect, the same limitation
is applied to a loss group of corporations and to a loss subsidiary
corporation." Thus the continuity required for carryover of losses
among enterprises with consolidated returns is entirely a matter of the
ownership of the enterprises which have been grouped together for
accounting purposes. The nature of the businesses involved has nothing
to do with it.7 One Regulation" does contain a business test but the
purpose of it is only to explain the application of section 382(a) to
consolidated groups where the parent undergoes the required change
of ownership. The Regulation adds no new requirements.
When enterprises are consolidated for purposes of tax accounting
and even more so when they are combined under the same corporate
entity, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to identify income as
coming from the formerly losing enterprise. A ruling" attempted to
solve this problem under the 1939 Code by shifting to the taxpayer the
burden of identifying the income of the losing enterprise. This approach
would discourage measures that might otherwise be economically very
desirable. For example, it might be desirable to consolidate overhead
costs such as office space, but the savings from this would be very
difficult to allocate. Similar problems arise for the treatment of labor
expense where the two businesses overlap, profits from the gain business
which are plowed into the formerly losing business, and income from
an expansion of the profitable business with assets from the losing
business."0
It has recently been suggested that section 482 might be used as
a means of preventing the use of losses from one business to offset
72. Former Treas. Reg. § 1.502-31(b)(3), T.D. 6140, 1955-2 Cult. BuLL. 317, as
amended, T.D. 6813, 1965-1 Cume. BULL. 436, T.D. 6841 (1965) (unpublished). See
Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c) (1966).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(f) (1966).
75. Provided there has been no multiple surtax election under section 1562.
76. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(d) (1966) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)
(1966).
77. See Cohen, The New Consolidated Return Regs: A Bird's-Eye View of
the Extensive Changes, 24 J. TAx. 82 (1966).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(e) (1) (1966).
79. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 CuMi. BULL. 475.
80. These problems are raised in Sinrich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against its
Application Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAx. L. REv. 167, 174 (1958).
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gains from another with which it has been combined."' This section
is to some extent a limitation on the idea that the tax laws are blind to
the nature of operations within the corporate structure. For example,
in Commissioner v. Chelsea Prod. Inc.82 a company which made and
sold fans and blowers split into a sales company and a manufacturing
company. The Commissioner attempted to reallocate sales company
profits to the manufacturing company for purposes of the excess profits
tax under the predecessor of section 482. The court said that this sec-
tion was intended to place accounting on a par with corporations under
separate control and dealing at arm's length. These profits were found
to be calculated in that manner and a reallocation was denied. In Central
Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioer83 the court affirmed a reallocation of
expenses to the appropriate fiscal year of a successor corporation in order
to match the expenses against related revenues and prevent a loss carry-
back 84
It thus appears that section 482 may be useful to reallocate
between fiscal years as well as between corporations within one
fiscal year. But there are other substantial difficulties with the ap-
plication of section 482 in this area. First, it is not clear that
section 482 may be applied to reallocate between two divisions of a
corporation, which has been filing a single return from year to year.
Second, the problem in a loss carryover case would not be that
expenses have not been properly matched against revenues or that
two organizations have not accounted for their dealings with each
other as if they were at arm's length. The problem would be rather
that the losses and profits, which may be correctly calculated in an
accounting sense, have come from "unrelated" businesses. The lan-
guage of section 482 may be broad enough to overcome these dif-
ficulties but if section 482 is used in this way, it should be recognized
as a significant step beyond the section's present uses.
IV. THE "OWNERSHIP" TEST
A. Definitionl under Present Law
Difficult as it is to manage, the business test should not be
eliminated unless the system as a whole functions better without it.
The problems of the "ownership" test must therefore also be evaluated.
81. Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
82. 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).
83. 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
84. Dillard-Valtermire, Inc. v. Campbell, 255 F2d 433 (5th Cir. 1958) and
Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962) are similar examples of the
reallocation of expenses to match revenues with which they were obviously related.
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These problems are difficult but are seldom if ever made less dif-
ficult by the presence of a business test except where a clear-cut change
in business has enabled a court to avoid a difficult ownership issue.
1. The 1954 Code
The net operating loss carryover is originally generated as an
attribute of some corporation. It remains an attribute of that cor-
poration unless section 381 gives it to some other corporation or unless
section 382, section 269, or possibly the Libson Shops doctrine takes
it away. For purposes of this paper it is sufficiently accurate to
describe the scope of section 381 as covering transfers of assets in one
of the tax-free reorganizations described in section 368. Section 381
is based upon a "business" principle in the sense that the carryover
goes with the assets if the assets are transferred in a prescribed way.
But since the application of section 381 depends entirely on the tests
used in applying section 368, section 381 does not require the use of
a "business" test in the sense that has been discussed here. In fact,
section 381 allows the carryover in many situations where the business
test would otherwise deny it. For example, the Libson case itself would
come out differently under this section.85
The carryover made available by section 381 is limited by
section 382(b)."8 This section, unlike section 382(a), contains no
references to a change in business. It provides for a reduction in the
amount of the carryover if the shareholders of the loss corporation
own, by reason of their interest in the loss corporation, less than
twenty per cent of the fair market value of the stock of the acquiring
corporation after the reoraganization. The carryover is reduced by
five per cent for each one per cent under twenty per cent which these
shareholders received."7 No attempt is made to limit the carryover
to gains from the assets of the loss corporation.88 The ownership
approach of this limitation is further demonstrated by the exception
85. One benefit of section 381 is that it preserves the carryover through minor
changes in the corporate entity such as the reincorporation in another state, Newmarket
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957).
86. Section 381(b)(3) limits the availability of the carryback. The use of losses
developed after a transaction to offset previous gains raises somewhat different policy
questions from those raised by the acquisition of a known loss history; this article is
limited to the latter and will not deal with the treatment of carrybacks.
87. For example, if the interest of the loss corporation shareholders after the
reorganization is 15%, the acquiring corporation receives only 75% of the carryover.
88. In Foremost Dairies v. Tomlinson, 238 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Fla. 1963),
aff'd per curiam, 341 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1965), decided under the 1939 CoDE, the court
applied Libson to allow a carryover against post-merger profits earned solely by the
loss corporation assets. This approach depends upon continued separate accounting and
is subject to all the difficulties discussed above in connection with consolidated
accounting.
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in section 382(b) (3), which makes the reduction inapplciable if both
corporations are owned substantially by the same persons in the same
proportion."° This limitation is a very crude treatment of the con-
tinuity of ownership principle; it introduces a factor which has no
apparent relation to the policy of the carryover, namely the relative
value of the two companies. For example, if the two corporations are
under entirely separate ownership prior to the reorganization, as much
as eighty per cent of the benefit of the carryover might go to the
shareholders of the profitable corporation without any reduction in
the carryover. But if the value of the loss corporation is only one
tenth that of the combined enterprise and the owners of the profitable
corporation owned eighty per cent of the loss corporation prior to the
merger, they will nevertheless find their carryover cut in half."0
Section 382(b) contains one other notable provision. If Z cor-
poration, a loss corporation, is merged into Y corporation, which is con-
trolled (within the meaning of section 368(c) ) by X corporation, and the
former shareholders of Z corporation receive X corporation stock,
section 382(b) (6) provides that the twenty per cent test is to be
applied by comparing Z corporation with Y corporation, not with X
corporation. The purpose of this provision is not clear. If X is huge
in relation to Z, the interest of the Z shareholders in X might be much
smaller than the relative values of Z and Y. But since by hypothesis
the benefits of the carryover flow to X by reason of its ownership of
Y, the continued interest of the Z shareholders in the carryover should
be measured by their interest in X, however small it is. This interest
will be the same no matter where within the structure of X corporation
Z's assets are put.9 '
Section 382(a) further limits the availability of a carryover by
denying it altogether to a corporation which has undergone a described
change in ownership and a change in business as discussed above. The
method for determining when a sufficient change in ownership has
taken place is set out out in the section and in some elaborate Regula-
89. If A and B each owned 50% of Loss Corp. and Gain Corp. and they are
merged in such a way that the Loss Corp. shareholders receive 10% of Gain Corp. stock,
the limitation of section 382(b) would be applicable but for this exception, although
the 100% continuity of interest obviously makes this an inappropriate case for the
limitation. But, as is noted in Comment, Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Corporate
Adjustments: Retaining an Advantageous Tax History Under Libson Shops and
Sections 269, 381 and 382, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1256 (1960), the parties could avoid the
section 382(b) problem without affecting their rights simply by issuing extra stock
to themselves as Loss Corp. shareholders.
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-l(d) (2), example (4) (1962).
91. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.382(b)-1(g)(1) (1962). Paragraph (1)(g)(2) of this
Regulation is equally difficult to understand for the same reason.
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tions. Complicated as these provisions are, they are very mechanical
by comparison with section 382(a)(1)(C)'s business test and they
have not as yet generated any litigation. Greatly simplified, the
change is sufficient if the interest of the ten largest shareholders is
fifty percentage points higher than it was two years before and if the
increase is due to either a purchase of stock or a redemption of stock
by the corporation.2 Section 382 (a) (4) defines "purchase" so as to
exclude tax-free reorganizations.
The most striking feature of this statutory pattern is the difference
in treatment accorded tax-free and taxable transactions. If the business
changes hands in a tax-free transaction, the required continuity of
ownership is twenty percent; the amount of carryover allowed is
reduced gradually at levels of lesser ownership and the nature of the
continuing business is irrelevant. If the transaction is taxable, the
requisite continuity of ownership is fifty per cent; no carryover is
allowed at levels of lesser ownership yet if the continuing business is
the same, no continuity of ownership at all is required. There are
some changes in corporate entity, such as those described in section
368(a) (1) (F), which have so little economic significance that the
policy which makes them tax-free under section 368 should also
preserve the carryover. But this cannot explain section 381's reliance
on the forms of transaction described in 368(a) (1) (A) and (C). It
is not at all clear that the policies which have resulted in non-recogni-
tion of gain upon the transfer of assets in exchange for stock should
also lead to a more liberal treatment of the carryover if the loss
business is changed and a less liberal treatment if the loss business is
continued. One possible explanation is that a loss corporation fre-
quently would have potential further losses on the transfer of its
assets and the present statutes force the taxpayer to choose between
these losses and the carryover because the carryover survives a recogni-
tion transaction only when the entity of the loss corporation is pre-
served. But if this is the statutory purpose it certainly could have
been accomplished in a more direct fashion.
Section 269's relationship to these sections is not clear. The
Senate Report on section 382 contains this puzzling statement:
If a limitation in this section applies to a net operating
loss carryover, section 269, relating to acquisitions made to
evade or avoid income tax, shall not also be applied to such
net operating loss carryover. However, the fact that a limita-
92. Or both. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (b) (2) (iv) (1962).
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tion under this section does not apply shall have no effect upon
whether section 269 applies. 3
With respect to the limitation in section 382(a), this statement is
meaningless because if section 382(a) applies there is nothing more
section 269 can do. But the statement is significant if interpreted to
mean that a partial reduction under section 382(b) precludes applica-
tion of section 269. The Internal Revenue Service has taken a position
flatly to the contrary 4 but this does not necessarily settle the problem.
2. The Libson Shops Doctrine
Although not invojved in the Libson case itself, change of owner-
ship has always been an important part of this doctrine's "continuity
of business enterprise" standard. Defining Libson's ownership test is
made difficult by the same factor that makes defining the business test
difficult-these changes often occur together and the court relies upon
their cumulative effect." It is very difficult to generalize about the
amount of continuity of ownership needed to satisfy Libson. In Jidius
Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner0 Judge Friendly relied partly on
an increase in ownership from fifty-eight to ninety-five per cent but
the opinion reflects great discomfort over a close case. In Meridan
Corp. v. United States 7 a decrease from one hundred to fifty-one per
cent was sufficient to support an alternative ground for disallowance."
The Internal Revenue Service has said it would apply Libson if the
business changes and the ownership change is more than "minor."0 0
Little can be said with confidence about the content of this test.0 0
3. Is Libson Shops still alive ?1 1
Of course the whole question of the content of the Libson Shops
doctrine may be moot if Libson is not applicable under the 1954
Code. Part of this question has been foreclosed by revenue rulings
93. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621,
4923 (1954).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-6, example (2) (1962).
95. See, e.g., Norden-Ketay Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1963)
J.G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1962); Mill Ridge Coal
Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
96. 335 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965).
97. 253 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
98. The court relied primarily on the predecessor to section 269.
99. Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 Cuzm. BULL. 46.
100. In Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894 (1964), a 25% owner of the loss corporation
had effective control. The same individual owned 100% of the gain corporation. The
court said that ownership had changed for Libson purposes but relied primarily on
differing economic activities.
101. See gencrally, Comment, Loss Carryover-The Viability of the Libsom Shops
Doctrine Under the 1954 Code, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1966).
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which make litigation of the point unlikely. For example, it has been
stated that Libson will not be relied upon in any transaction described
in section 381(a).12 The Treasury.. has also excluded from
Libson those cases in which there has been no change in business as
described in section 382(a) (1) (C) 94 or those in which there has
been less than a fifty per cent change in the "beneficial ownership
of the loss."
The other side of the coin is that the Service will rely on Libson
where this "beneficial ownership" has changed. This position results
from the Service's non-acquiescence in the one case which has directly
considered this problem: Max well Hardware Co. v. Commissioner."
In the Maxwell case the assets of a partnership in real estate develop-
ment were transferred to a real estate "department," set up for this
purpose, of an unprofitable hardware corporation. The real estate
developers, who had no previous interest in the hardware company,
took non-voting preferred stock which was redeemable in kind after
six years, for ninety per cent of the real estate department's assets.
Control over the common stock was transferred to a voting trustee.
The Tax Court opinion.. reveals that under the agreement one of
the former partners had complete control over the real estate depart-
ment and the hardware business was discontinued. In effect, the
developers got six years' use of the hardware corporation's loss carry-
overs in exchange for a ten per cent slice of the pie. Neither section
269 nor section 382 could touch this transaction. The court of appeals
arguing at some length that Libson. had no value under the 1954 Code,
reversed the Tax Court and allowed the carryovers.
One difficulty with the court's reasoning is that it seems to have
approached the problem as if Congress has acted in response to the
Libson doctrine. The court said:
By enacting the 1954 Code, Congress destroyed the prece-
dential value of the rule of decision of Libson Shops; that
is, that for a loss carryover deduction to be allowed, the in-
come against which the offset was claimed must have been
produced by substantially the same business which incurred
102. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 147; Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum.
BULL. 475.
103. T.I.R. No. 778, P-H 1965 FED. TAX SERV. f1 55,096.
104. In Commercial Indus. Corp. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 52 (D.N.J. 1967)
the court, after an exhaustive review of Libson doctrine cases, concludes that Libson
has never been applied to deny a carryover on the ground of a change in ownership alone.
105. 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
106. Arthur T. Beckett, 41 T.C. 386 (1963).
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the losses. This is not now the law. 11 7
Of course, Congress could not have been "destroying" anything because
Libson was not decided until 1957. The Internal Revenue Service
argues that section 382 was only a limited attack on certain abuses
specifically brought to the attention of Congress. If section 382 is
directed only at what the House Report calls "trafficking,"'0 8 then
Libson is very much alive because there was no trafficking at all in
the Libson case. But the 1954 Code also added section 381 which, by
its modification of the "entity" approach, shows that Congress had
broader purposes.
The versatility of the parties in Maxwell shows the importance of
flexibility in the administration of ownership criteria. It is very hard
to square the result in that case with the policies of section 172; the
benefit of the carryover went primarily to new people in a business
different from the losing business. The Internal Revenue Service has
developed.0 9 a "beneficial ownership" approach to the problem of a
need for added flexibility and Libson provides a convenient authority
for doing so."'
The need for this kind of flexibility is further illustrated by
Jackson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States."' This case involved a
financing plan for General Motors dealerships whereby the dealership
is incorporated and GM provides seventy-five per cent of the initial
capital. The individual provides the other twenty-five per cent. For its
seventy-five per cent, GM takes half in an unsecured long-term loan
and the other half in Class A voting stock. The individual takes Class
B non-voting stock. The individual is made president of the corporation
and gets a salary and bonus. The earnings of the corporation are used
107. 343 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1965).
108. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
4017, 4067 (1954) ; see text accompanying note 20 supra.
109. T.I.R. No. 773, P-H 1965 FED. TAX SERV. 55,063.
110. The Sixth Circuit has now joined the Ninth in holding that Libson Shops
does not apply under the 1954 CODE. Frederick Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d
351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3158 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1967). This case also
shows that present statutory ownership criteria do not sufficiently protect the loss
carryover from what the Supreme Court has characterized as abuse. The opinion in the
court of appeals reveals only that there was not a change of ownership such as is
described in section 382(a) (1) and so the carryover must be allowed. The Tax Court
opinion, 42 T.C. 13 (1964), is much more revealing. The controlling shareholder of the
taxpayer corporation purchased his shares when the corporation was virtually a shell.
He did not transfer the assets of his profitable steel business to the taxpayer until two
years had elapsed since his acquisition of taxpayer's stock. The benefit of the carryover
here went to a new individual in a business different from the losing business. The
only effect of section 382 was the loss of carryovers for two years. This case raises
precisely the same policy issues as Maxwell and should stand or fall with it.
111. 237 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1964), affd, 371 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1967).
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partly to amortize the note, partly to redeem Class A stock and partly
to pay a dividend. The Class B dividends are used to buy Class A stock
from GM and convert it to Class B. In this particular case the corpora-
tion was founded as John Williams Buick and sold Buicks in Colorado.
It incurred losses and then sold its assets and became dormant. Later
GM had the charter amended and the name changed and reestablished
the corporation, under the same financing plan, as an Oldsmobile
dealership in Georgia. At all times GM had at least sixty per cent of
the equity and all the votes. The court allowed the carryover. It said
that the limitations of sections 382(a) and 269 were inapplicable
because ownership had not sufficiently changed; this is literally true.
The court also said that the Libson continuity test was met and
thereby avoided the issue of its applicability under the 1954 Code.'
This case demonstrates that the beneficiary of the carryover is not
necessarily the "owner" in any conventional sense of the term. From
one view, GM bore the brunt of the losses of the Colorado dealership
and GM got the benefit of the carryover because, in the first few years
of the new dealership, most of the earnings were applied to reduce
GM's interest. So perhaps Internal Revenue's "benficial ownership
of the carryover" test would favor the taxpayer here. But the dealership
was basically Jackson's enterprise-he managed it and, so long as it
remained profitable, he would remain in practical control and increase
his equity by a prescribed formula. In a very real sense Jackson was
the beneficiary of the carryover because each dollar that it added to
earnings was applied to increasing his equity. On the same reasoning
the real sufferer of the losses was Williams in Colorado, who lost his
business and all chance to recoup. It is therefore far from clear that
the policies of the carryover would call for its application to Jackson.
This case and Maxwell show that beneficial ownership of the carryover
is not necessarily the same as ownership of the common stock.
Before it is concluded that Libson should be retained as a source
of flexibility in this area, some consideration should be given to the
possibility that section 382 might itself be flexible enough to deal with
such cases. The section does not define "ownership" directly but it
does provide in section 382 (a) (1) (B) (i) that the required ownership
could come about by purchase of ". . . stock of another corporation
112. A ruling that Libson is applicable under the 1954 CODE would be dictum in a
case which allows the carryover. The issue was especially confused here because the
time period involved straddled the enactment of the 1954 CODE. The court held that the
1954 CODE limitations applied because all the relevant events other than the losses
occurred after 1954 but it may have thought that the 1939 CoDE affected the use of
pre-1954 losses even if used after 1954. This article does not consider the difficulties
raised by the transition to the 1954 CODE.
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owning stock in such corporation, or an interest in a partnership or
trust owning stock in such corporation . . ." This language does not
demand a definition of "own" broader than possession of the legal
title to the interests described there but it at least permits a broader
interpretation. For example, the contractual power to control a voting
trust, such as the one to which the stock was transferred in the Maxwell
case, might be considered an "interest" in the trust within the meaning
of section 382. But by its very specificity this section limits the power
of the courts to stretch the language in order to carry out the legislative
purposes supposedly behind the carryover provision. Reliance exclu-
sively on the language of this section would therefore be an open
invitation to the ingenuity of the tax bar and the Internal Revenue
Service is understandably reluctant to give up Libson's more gen-
eralized approach.
As the law stands now, Libson. Shops remains the most authorita-
tive statement of the purposes of the loss carryover provision and it
is a narrow view. Because the most recent efforts of Congress in this
area antedate this case, Congress cannot be said to have acted specific-
ally with respect to this interpretation. Because the present statutory
pattern leaves room for many transactions, such as Maxwell and
Jackson Oldsmobile, which seem to be beyond the purposes of the
carryover as the Supreme Court has expressed them, Internal Revenue
seems to be justified in continuing to use Libson to attack such cases
until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks again.
B. Some General Problems
1. Ownwrship of what?
If, as this paper proposes, the nature of the businesses conducted
is made irrelevant to the administration of the carryover, then there
must be some other means of identifying just what it is that is "owned."
The approach of the present Code is basically to attach the losses to a
corporate entity, so that ownership of the loss carryover is an incident
of ownership of the corporation's common stock. Thus when Congress
declared in the 1954 Code that the carryover should survive certain
changes in the corporate entity, it was necessary to describe particular
forms which the change must take. As has been pointed out, Congress
selected the forms described in section 368; this was a convenient way
of doing it although the overlap between the policies behind the carry-
over and the policies behind tax-free exchanges of assets is far from
perfect.
The use of the corporate entity as a starting point must remain
the Code's basic approach. With the exception of Subchapter S,1 3
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a corporation is generally treated as a taxable entity and the problems
of the carryover are hardly limited to corporations small enough to
qualify for Subchapter S. In fact, the possession of loss carryovers
by large, widely-held corporations is one of the biggest difficulties
with an ownership test for administration of the carryover. Where the
stock of a corporation is actively traded on a securities exchange,
"continuity of ownership" is a meaningful concept only in the sense
that, under the terms of a reorganization, ownership of stock in
one corporation, a party to the reorganization, entitles the shareholder to
ownership of stock in another party. In the case of publicly-held corpora-
tions "ownership" of the carryover must be considered as attaching to the
stock itself, not to the individual who holds it. This is not inconsistent
with the notion of "beneficial" ownership of the carryover because if the
stock is actively traded then it is likely that the losses of the company and
the value of the carryover will have been reflected in the price of the
stock.
One difficulty with the "entity" approach is that, in the simple
case of a taxable sale of a closely-held business, the status of the
carryover depends upon whether or not the stock is sold, in which case
the carryover inay go with the stock but definitely will not remain with
the former owner, or the assets are sold, in which case the carryover
nay remain available to the former owner but definitely will not go
with the assets. If the business test is eliminated, then the purchaser
cannot use the carryover regardless of the form chosen. There would
thus be less pressure on the seller to sell the entity and the use of the
entity as a means of identifying ownership of the carryover would
not interfere with the more basic policy of leaving the loss carryover
with the individual who suffered the losses when the corporation is
small and closely-held and when that individual can be identified.
2. Beneficial ownership and control
A second general problem with the ownership test is that the
right to receive earnings and appreciation in value of the stock is
very often not held by the same people who control the policies of the
company. By its emphasis on beneficial ownership, the Internal
Revenue Service may have indicated that continuity in the right to
receive earnings is closer to the purposes of the carryover in a case
where the two conflict. The two were not really in conflict in Maxwell
because of the right of the real estate partners to bail out after six
years. Jackson Oldsmobile is perhaps a better illustration of the
113. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
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problem because it is not easy to locate either the benefits or the
control in that case. To the extent that the carryover is intended to
increase fairness in the burden of taxes, its proper focus would seem
to be upon those with the right to receive earnings and upon those who
suffer by a drop in the price of shares when the corporation loses.
3. Reorgani)zations in bankruptcy
A related problem is determining whether or not the "continuity
of ownership" test is satisfied when the corporation has undergone a
reorganization in bankruptcy, as a result of which the old common
shareholders have a much reduced interest, if any, and ownership and
control have passed to former creditors and preferred shareholders.
In such a case ownership has changed hands subsequent to the initial
incidence of losses. But it may be argued that equitable ownership
passes to the creditors when the corporation becomes insolvent. Thus
in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co." 4 the Court held
that the equitable ownership of the creditors should be dated from the
day they "invoke the processes of law.""' The Court therefore held
that the "continuity of interest" test of tax-free reorganization was
satisfied."'
An effort to use this argument to support a loss carryback failed
in W1isconsin Cent. R. R. v. United States."' A newly organized
corporation took over the assets of a railroad which was in receiver-
ship. In the process the unsecured creditors and preferred and common
shareholders of the railroad were wiped out. The predecssor cor-
poration had a gain in 1953 and the new corporation sought to carry
back its 1954 loss. The court, citing Libson, denied the carryover
under the 1939 Code.
This case may be distinguishable from an ordinary carryforward
because the loss was suffered subsequent to reorganization and there-
fore "belonged" unquestionably to the new owners. But this would
seem to be a stronger case for continuity than the carryforward.
Despite its 1953 profit the railroad was in serious trouble in 1953;
it had been in receivership since 1932 and in trusteeship under section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act since 1944. Thus the bondholders had the
equitable right to whatever there was in this corporation long before
1953 and the reasoning of the Alabama Asphaltic Limestone case
would seem to be applicable. But in the case of a corporation which
114. 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
115. Id. at 184.
116. See also Atlas Oil & Ref. Corp. 36 T.C. 675 (1961).
117. 296 F.2d 750 (Ct. CI. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
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suffers losses sufficient to bring on insolvency and bankruptcy re-
organization and which earns profits after reorganization, it is not
nearly so clear that the "owners!' in the loss period are the creditors
and not the old common shareholders.
Nevertheless the carryover should be allowed in such a case.
Such reorganizations are generally forced by circumstances and would
seldom if ever be the vehicle for the kind of transaction normally
thought of as an abuse of the carryover privilege. Also, it would be
extremely narrow and formalistic to argue that the creditors of a
corporation are not beneficially interested in the corporation's losses
merely because their preferred position might allow them to recoup.
Furthermore, disallowing the carryover would work against the plain
purpose of bankruptcy reoganizations, which is to help a sick cor-
poration get back on its feet.
The 1954 Code does not deal specifically with this problem
perhaps because, in most such cases, the "business" test of section
38 2 (a) (1) (C) would be met. The problem is a serious one if, as this
article recommends, that subsection is repealed or if the entity is
changed in the process of reorganization. Although section 371 makes
most such reorganizations tax-free, these reorganizations are not enum-
erated in section 381(a), perhaps because section 381 also confers
other benefits besides the net operating loss carryover which may not
be appropriate in a bankruptcy reorganization. 18
4. Transfers of ownership among related taxpayers
Another difficult range of problems is raised when beneficial
ownership or control has shifted to an individual or legal entity which
is related to the former owner in one of the ways described in section
318. Section 382 specifically considers the problem but its approach is
a little confusing. Section 382 (a) (2) described the group whose stock
is counted to 'determine whether or not the requisite fifty percentage
point change is present; for purposes of selecting the ten members of
the group, persons whose stock is attributable to each other under section
382 (a) (3) are counted as one. Section 382 (a) (3) simply invokes the
118. In Huyler's v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1964), the taxpayer
went through a Chapter X reorganization which in effect gave 52% of the stock to
former creditors. New investors took the other 48%; the old shareholders took nothing.
The court denied the carryover, reyling on Libson and finding a "substantial" shift in
ownership. The court rejected the argument that the creditors were really the pre-sale
owners of the business; it found sufficient shifts for Libson purposes among the other
48%. The court also rejected issues raised by section 382 by saying that meeting
section 382 would not be conclusive. Since section 269 is never mentioned, this appears
to be an implication that Libson is applicable under the 1954 CoDE but the court
never discussed the point.
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rules of section 318."' The obvious purpose of this pattern is to prevent
avoidance of section 382 by transferring stock to a large number of con-
trolled persons or legal entities so that the interest of the largest ten would
not total fifty per cent.
What is left unclear is whether or not the operation of the
attribution rules under section 382 (a) (3) is meant to be confined to
the single purpose spelled out in section 382 (a) (2) -attribution among
persons who have "purchased" stock within the two year period.
Section 382 (a) (3) is equally subject to the broader interpretation
that it attributes to a purchaser all the stock which was owned by a
related person before the purchase as well as the stock which has
been subsequently purchased by a related person. For example, suppose
that a father owned all the stock of a loss corporation and sold the
stock to his son in an arm's length transaction. If section 382 (a) (3)
only attributes among purchasers, then the requisite change of owner-
ship has taken place. But if section 382 (a) (3) attributes the father's
stock to the son prior to the purchase, then there has been no increase
in ownership at all.
So far this issue has not been directly considered, but one recent
case which raises similar issues shows that the direction which the
Code should take is by no means clear. In Pauline TV. Ach.2° Mrs.
Ach owned and ran a profitable dress shop as a sole proprietorship.
Her son Roger owned all the stock of an unprofitable corporation in
the dairy business. In 1953 the corporation discontinued the dairy
business and changed its name and Roger transferred slightly less
than a one-half interest to his brother without consideration. The
brothers then made Mrs. Ach president, treasurer, and board chairman
and she "sold" the dress shop to the corporation for a demand note at
book value, without interest. The dress shop continued as usual and
the corporation carried prior losses over against its profits. Profits
were used to pay off the note to Mrs. Ach and later to pay off old notes
of the corporation held by Mr. Ach. The beneficial ownership of the
losses was transferred from Roger to his mother but if the attribution
principle of section 318 is given a full application in this area, such a
transfer within the family is not a break in the continuity of ownership.
The Commissioner successfully attacked this transaction under
section 269 which, however, says nothing about attribution among
119. With one small change not important here.
120. 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966).
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related taxpayers.' If Congress intends not to permit transfers
within the family for the principal purpose of tax avoidance, then
section 382(a) (3) should be given the narrow construction that the
attribution is only among purchasers. But it is significant here that
section 382(a) only applies to stock acquisitions by purchase. Trans-
fers among related taxpayers will often be without consideration and
section 382(a) will not reach them. There is no apparent reason for
applying section 382(a) to a transfer among the same people solely
because consideration is paid but to avoid that result section 382(a)
(3) must be given the broader construction. Section 269 would remain
a weapon against transfers of this type. 2
5. The extent of continuity of ownership to be required
The task of administering the net operating loss carryover in
light of its purposes is not one problem but many. The tests in the
Code must deal with a myriad of situations ranging from small
closely-held corporations to vast enterprises with thousands of share-
holders and with transactions involving many different kinds of change
in shareholder interests. It is perhaps too much to expect a single
uniform standard to apply equally well to all such situations. There is
certainly no single standard under present law, even if the focus is
upon ownership tests to the exclusion of tests based upon motive,
accounting practice, and nature of the business. Sections 382(a), and
382(b), and 269 each have their own formula. Libson Shops, as most
recently construed, adds yet another. In some situations, such as the
exception to section 382(b) for corporations owned by the same
persons in the same proportion, the extent of deviation permitted is
very narrow."' Yet the amount of continuity required in section 382
121. In Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961), the court held that the constructive ownership rules
of the 1939 CODE were not applicable to section 129, the predecessor of section 269.
122. Problems of transfer within the family are also present in Kolker Bros., 35
T.C. 299 (1960). In that case a company controlled by Sidney Kolker acquired at
arm's length the assets of a company controlled by his father and successfully carried
losses over against profits from the acquired assets. The "ownership" of the loss did
not change, so this case may be within the principle of Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1
Cum. BuLL. 46, see text following note 16 supra, although the I.R.S. specifically
announced its non-acquiescence in Kolker Bros. on the ground that the change in
Sidney Kolker's interest was too "substantial." 1963-1 Cux. BuI.L. 5. Neither the
court nor the I.R.S. considered the intra-family aspects of the case.
123. Just how narrow is the deviation permitted under this section has been
illustrated in Commonwealth Container Corp., 48 T.C.-, No. 47 (June 28, 1967).
In this case a 25% shareholder in the acquiring corporation had no interest in the loss
corporation and two shareholders who held approximately a 30% interest each in the
acquiring corporation held 42% interests in the loss corporation. The corporation
resulting from the merger was held not to qualify for the exception in section 382(b) (3).
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(b) itself for full use of the carryover is only twenty per cent. Section
382(a) takes an "all or nothing" approach, while section 382(b)
reduces the carryover gradually. Since the task of this article has
been to convince the reader that the business test should be abolished,
the problem of harmonizing all the ownership tests is a separate
problem which can be left to another day unless the need to harmonize
those tests is made more acute by eliminating the business test. Since
the problems of finding continuity of ownership have been present all
along, eliminating one source of confusion would not seem to aggravate
the other beyond its already nightmarish state.
V. CONcLUSION
Section 382 (a) (1) (C) should be repealed and the Libson Shops
doctrine should be applied, if at all, to deny carryovers only by
reason of a lack of continuity of ownership.
The business test is not eliminated entirely from the administra-
tion of net operating loss carryovers by taking these two steps. The
nature of the business remains relevant as an indication of the principal
purpose of the transaction for purposes of section 269.124
It is tempting to urge that application of section 269 to this area
also be discontinued. Since this section also contains an "ownership
change" prerequisite, many of the abuses not subject to attack under
section 382 are also immune from section 269. Elimination of the
business test from section 382 would further narrow the need for
section 269. Eliminating section 269's test of motive would sub-
stantially increase the simplicity of these provisions, facilitate tax
planning, and relieve the courts. If some continuity of ownership is
required, abuses of the carryover for tax avoidance purposes would
be limited somewhat. But there are substantial differences between the
prerequisites of ownership change in sections 382 and 269. For
example, one purpose of section 269 is to attack tax avoidance devices
involving shifts among related taxpayers. As discussed above125 sec-
tion 382 may not be concerned with such transfers. It is undersirable
to have a subjective standard of motive pervading an area where a
great many motives for transactions often act together. Further, tax
avoidance is itself a vague and slippery concept. But the carryover is
such an obvious target for devices for tax avoidance, as that term is
generally understood, that a provision is called for specifically declar-
ing that the carryover is not to be so used. So long as tax avoidance
124. Detailed consideration of the criteria governing application of section 269
is beyond the scope of this paper.
125. See text accompanying note 119 mipra.
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remains beyond the intended purposes of section 172, some attention
to the nature of the businesses involved is inevitable.
